Post-Fukushima energy policy changes, 2011 on
In July 2011 an Energy & Environment Council (Enecan or EEC) was
set up by the cabinet office as part of the National Policy Unit to
recommend on Japan's energy future to 2050.* It was chaired by the
Minister for National Policy to focus on future dependence on nuclear
power. Its initial review was to recommend that nuclear power's
contribution to electricity be targeted at 0%, 15%, or 20-25% for the
medium term – a 36% option was dropped.
* The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
and Central Environment Council apparently came under Enecan in 2011,
and have now been restored to previous status.
Meanwhile major Japanese companies such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi
started investing heavily in LNG production capacity from Australia and
elsewhere eg a 15% stake in Woodside's Browse LNG project for $2
billion. METI estimated that power generation costs would rise by over
JPY 3 trillion ($37 billion) per year, an equivalent of about 0.7
percent of gross domestic product, if utilities replaced nuclear energy
with thermal power generation. In February 2012 METI's minister said
that electricity costs would need to increase up to 15% while the
nuclear plants remained shut.*
* Meanwhile, costs of nuclear power
relative to alternatives were published. The Institute of Energy
Economics of Japan in 2011 put the cost of nuclear electricity
generation at ¥8.5 per kWh taking into account compensation of up to ¥10
trillion ($130 billion) for loss or damage from a nuclear accident.
Later in the year a draft report for Enecan estimated nuclear generation
costs for 2010 to be ¥8.9 per kWh (11.4 US cents). This included
capital costs (¥2.5), operation and maintenance costs (¥3.1), and fuel
cycle costs (¥1.4). In addition, the estimate included ¥0.2 for
additional post-Fukushima safety measures, ¥1.1 in policy expenses and
¥0.5 for dealing with future nuclear risks. The ¥0.5 for future nuclear
risks is a minimum: the cost would increase by ¥0.1 for each additional
¥1 trillion ($13 billion) of damage. The ¥8.9 figure was calculated
based on a model nuclear power plant using average figures from four
plants operating over the period since the 2004 estimate, with an output
of 1200 MWe and construction costs of ¥420 billion ($5.4 billion).
Costs were calculated assuming a discount rate of 3%, a capacity factor
of 70% and a 40-year operating life. The 2010 costs for fossil fuel
generation, including costs for CO2 measures, ranged from ¥9.5 for coal
through to ¥10.7 for LNG to ¥36.0 for oil. Projecting forward to 2030
the nuclear cost remains stable but fossil fuels costs increase
significantly.
Enecan's "Innovative Energy and Environment Strategy" was released in
September 2012, recommending a phase-out of nuclear power by 2040. In
the short term, reactors currently operable but shut down would be
allowed to restart once they gain permission from the incoming Nuclear
Regulatory Authority, but a 40-year operating limit would be imposed.
Reprocessing of used fuel would continue. Enecan promised a "green
energy policy framework" is promised by the end of 2012, focused on
burning imported gas (LNG) and coal, along with expanded use of
intermittent renewables. This provoked a strong and wide reaction from
industry, with a consensus that 20-25% nuclear was necessary to avoid
very severe economic effects, not to mention high domestic electricity
prices. In the past year increased fossil fuel imports had been a major
contributor to Japan's record trade deficit of JPY 2.5 trillion ($31.78
billion) in the first half of 2012. The Keidanren (Japan Business
Federation) said the Enecan phase-out policy was irresponsible, as did
the head of the Liberal Democratic Party.
Four days after indicating general approval of the Enecan plan, the
cabinet backed away from it, relegating it as "a reference document" and
the prime minister explained that flexibility was important in
considering energy policy. The timeline was dropped. Reprocessing used
nuclear fuel would continue and there was no impediment to continuing
construction of two nuclear plants – Shimane 3 and Ohma 1. A new basic
energy plan would be decided after further deliberation and
consultation, especially with municipalities hosting nuclear plants.
However, at the end of 2012 the new LDB government promptly abolished
Enecan, along with the National Policy Institute, so that METI’s
Advisory Committee for National Resources and Energy became responsible
for formulating energy plans, while MoE’s Central Environment Council
focuses on climate change matters. The new LDP prime minister ordered a
‘zero-based’ review of energy policies.
In December 2012, after a decisive victory in national elections for
the Diet's lower house, with 294 out of 480 seats, the Liberal
Democratic Party took a more positive view of restarting idled nuclear
power plants than its predecessor, which had seemed indifferent to
electricity shortages and massive LNG and other fossil fuel import
costs. (The DPJ won only 57 seats, down from 267) The new government
said it would take responsibility for allowing reactor restarts after
the Nuclear Regulatory Authority issues new safety standards and
confirms the safety of individual units. After abolishing Enecan it also
said that abandoning reprocessing of used fuel was ruled out.
Construction of Shimane 3 and Ohma 1 was to continue, and the
construction of up to 12 further units could be approved.
In July 2013, elections for the Diet’s upper house gave the LDP 115
seats out of 242. Its coalition partner and another pro-nuclear party
won 29 seats. This consolidated the LDP position and role in reviving
the economy, including restoring power supplies. The DPJ with its policy
of abandoning nuclear power by 2040 won only 59 seats. The LDP won a
seat in every constituency with a nuclear power plant. In Fukushima
prefecture the LDP candidate polled more than twice as many votes as the
DPJ candidate. In Fukui prefecture, where Kansai Electric Power Co. has
11 units, Japan Atomic Power Co. has two units, and the government has
the Monju prototype breeder reactor, an LDP candidate beat the DPJ
contender, 237,000 votes to 56,000.
2011-13 Electricity Supply Constraints and Changes and Power Plant Situation
The chairman of Japan's Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC)
warned in May 2011 that the organization expected the supply-demand
balance in summer 2011 would be very tight in the east coast areas
served by Tokyo Electric Power Co (Tepco), Tohoku Electric Power Co
(both 50 Hz) and Chubu Electric Power Co (60 Hz). He said that all the
utilities on the west coast of Japan will cooperate to transfer
electricity to the east coast, noting the significant role of nuclear
energy in ensuring a stable power supply*. He stressed the importance of
the government allowing those reactors currently shut down for mandated
periodic inspections to be able to return to service as soon as
possible. In particular, the government should help local authorities
and residents understand the importance of restarting those reactors
currently shut for periodic inspections.
Under Japanese regulations, the default period between inspections at
reactors is 13 months, but changes made in 2009 allow operators to
apply to increase this to 18 months. Subject to approval, a five-year
introductory period would follow, after which the limit could be raised
to 24 months between inspections – more in line with international
practices.
The median capacity factor for Japanese nuclear plants is about 70% –
compared with over 90% for the best performers worldwide – with the
country's inspection requirements a contributing factor to this
difference. Most other countries conduct regulatory checks so that
utilities can operate their power plants almost all of the time that
refuelling or major maintenance is not taking place.
Decline in operating capacity
By mid-May 2011, only 17 out of Japan's 50 remaining nuclear power
reactors (apart from Monju and written-off Fukushima Daiichi 1-4) were
in operation. This represented 15,493 MWe, or 35%, of the total
remaining nuclear generating capacity of 44,396 MWe. Twenty units, with a
combined capacity of 17,705 MWe (40% of total nuclear capacity) were
not operating as they had been shut for periodic inspections, while
another two units (1700 MWe) had been shut for unplanned inspections or
equipment replacement.
Units 4 and 5 at Chubu Electric's Hamaoka plant were shut down at the
government's request in May 2011 to increase their resistance to
tsunamis. Chubu is spending some JPY 140 billion ($1.7 billion) on
seawall defences, which are expected to be complete by the end of 2013.
During the shutdown process for the unit 5 ABWR, a burst pipe in the
condenser allowed seawater to enter the main cooling circuit and some
5000 litres reached the reactor itself, but disassembly and inspection
to December 2012 revealed no serious corrosion damage to fuel assemblies
or other components. It is expected to be ready to restart about
mid-2014, subject to NRA clearance.
The other nine units – with a combined capacity of 8826 MWe (20% of
total nuclear capacity) – shut down during the 11 March earthquake and
have not restarted. These nine reactors – units 1 and 3 of the Onagawa
plant, unit 2 of the Tokai plant, all four units at the Fukushima Daini
plant and units 5 and 6 of the Fukushima Daiichi – are in cold shutdown
and have progressively been joined by others as maintenance outages came
due. (Four units – Fukushima Daiichi units 1 to 4, total 2719 MWe –
were written off and are to be decommissioned.)
After May 2011 the number of operating reactors steadily dwindled to zero.
Tepco – owner of the Fukushima plants, and supplier of about one
third of the country's electricity – in mid May 2012 had only 4912 MWe
of nuclear generating capacity in operation out of its former nuclear
capacity of 17,308 MWe, or 14,060 MWe then, at three plants.
In the summer of 2011 stringent energy conservation measures were
applied leading to a 12% reduction in power consumption (relative to
2010) in August, and more significantly, a reduction in peak demand
reaching 18%, exceeding the government target of 15%.
In March 2012 JAIF said that 35 nuclear reactors might be subject to
extended outage, and the fate of some others was in doubt. A 12%
shortage of electricity was expected in summer 2012, carbon emission had
risen to 1210 Mt/yr – 14% above 1990 level, and the cost of additional
fossil fuel imports due to nuclear capacity being offline was about $40
billion per year (about $333 per person).
Tsunami defences
Chubu Electric Power Co is undertaking increased tsunami and flooding
protection for the Hamaoka nuclear power plant, which was closed in
response to an extraordinary request from the Japanese prime minister.
The plant is in a region of high seismic activity, where a large
undersea earthquake can be expected within the next 30 years. Behind a
row of sand dunes measuring between 10 and 15 metres high above sea
level, the company has erected a new 1.6 km breakwater wall reaching 22
metres above sea level. On the main plant site, measures will be taken
to mitigate general serious flooding in case a tsunami overwhelms the
breakwater. They include the waterproofing of diesel generator rooms and
seawater pumps, as well as the installation of pumps in the building
basements. Grid connections are to be doubled up, with another set of
diesel generators complete with long-term fuel supply installed on
ground behind the main plant buildings about 25 metres above sea level.
Spare parts for seawater pumps will be kept in a hardened building and
heavy earthmoving capability will be maintained.
Hokkaido is building a seawall 1.25 km long and up to 6.5 m high at its Tomari site, which is 10 m above sea level.
In April 2012 Kansai announced that it would spend more than JPY 200
billion ($2.5 billion) over four years on defences against earthquakes
and tsunamis at its eleven reactors. Kansai submitted the plans to the
government as a precondition for restarting its two Ohi reactors in
western Japan.
Stress Tests 2011-12
Nuclear risk and safety reassessments – “stress tests” – along the
lines of those in Europe were carried out in 2011. The stage 1 stress
test results for individual plants were considered first by NISA and
then by the Nuclear Safety Commission before being forwarded to the
prime minister's office for final approval. Local government must then
approve restart. Late in March 2012 NISA had received stage 1
assessments for 17 reactors – 12 PWRs and 5 BWRs. Three of these – Ohi 1
& 2 and Ikata 3 – had been approved by NISA and two confirmed by
NSC. In September NISA finished reviewing those for six units:
Hokkaido’s Tomari 1 & 2, Kansai’s Takahama 3 & 4 and Kyushu’s
Sendai 1 & 2. Its findings and comments were forwarded to the new
Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA), which is now responsible for approving
restarts. It appears that at least 12 stress test assessments then
remained at the review stage, including Hokuriku’s Shika 1 & 2,
Genkai 2, 3 & 4; Mihama 3; Tsuruga 2; Higashidori 1; Takahama 1;
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 1 & 7; Ohi 1 and Ikata 1.
In mid-April 2012, after a series of high-level meetings, the
Japanese government approved the restart of Kansai Electric’s Ohi 3
& 4 reactors, and urged the Fukui governor and the Ohi mayor to
endorse this decision. They restarted in July 2012. Without the twin
1180 MWe units, significant electricity shortages would have been likely
in summer peak periods.
Nuclear plant restarts
In October 2012 the new Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) which had
taken over from NISA and NSC announced that henceforth nuclear power
plant restart reviews would comprise both a safety assessment by NRA and
the briefing of affected local governments by the operators. The
assessment would be based on safety guidelines formulated by NRA in July
2013 after public consultation. In rulemaking, the NRA commissioners
referred to the guidelines of the IAEA, Finland, France and the USA, as
well as the former NISA July 2011 stress test rules and provisional
30-point measures, issued in April 2012, that were applied to the
restarts of Ohi 3 & 4.
In July 2013 four utilities applied for restart of 12 PWR reactors at
six sites, two of which – Ohi 3 & 4 – are already running on
interim basis. The units covered by the applications were Kansai's
Takahama units 3 & 4 and Ohi units 3 & 4; Hokkaido's Tomari
units 1-3; Shikoku's Ikata unit 3, and Kyushu's Sendai 1 & 2 and
Genkai 3 & 4. Gross capacity is 11,200 MWe, almost a quarter of the
nation’s total. These were all among the units well advanced in NISA’s
stress test assessments in 2012. Tepco delayed its application for
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 6 & 7 BWRs pending negotiation with local
government, and lodged it in September, lining up a further 2710 MWe
gross. As of September 2013 the NRA was prioritising six units: Tomari
3, Ikata 3, Sendai 1 & 2, Genkai 3 & 4 using four investigation
teams with 80 staff.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6&7 ABWR units are the first BWRs to be
put forward for restart. Unlike the 12 PWRs referred to above, BWRs
require a filtered containment venting (FCV) system. Under the general
terms of a nuclear operator's agreement with local government,
prefectural approval is required for these because any use during an
emergency would mean releasing radioactivity in the course of avoiding
the kind of hydrogen build-up which caused the explosions at Fukushima,
destroying the superstructure of three units there.
The reactor restarts are facing significant implementation costs
ranging from US$700 million to US$1 billion per unit, regardless of
reactor size or age. The NRA is working to increase its relicensing
staff to about 100 people, which could potentially shorten the currently
envisaged six-month review timeline. Under a high case scenario
developed by Itochu, about 10 reactors could be added every year for a
total of up to 35 reactors back online within five years.
Chubu announced that it planned to apply for restart of Hamaoka 4
(1100 MWe BWR) by the end of March 2014, and unit 3 a year later,
subject to completing work to conform with NRA regulations, local
government agreement, and community acceptance. Unit 5 (1360 MWe ABWR)
will also be ready to restart then.
Economic impact of shutdowns
JAIF has said that increased fuel imports are costing about JPY 4
trillion ($40 billion) per year (METI puts total fossil fuel imports at
JPY 9 trillion in FY2013). The trade deficit in FY2012 was JPY 6.9
trillion ($70 billion), and the same is expected in FY2103. The total
trade deficit from March 2011 to end of FY2013 in March 2014 is
estimated at JPY 16.4 trillion ($168 billion), compared with previous
surpluses of at least JPY 2.5 trillion per year.
Generation cost was up 56% from JPY 8.6/kWh to 13.5/kWh in FY 2012.
Losses across the utilities are about JPY 1 trillion per year. The
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (MITI) said in April 2013 that
Japanese power companies had spent an additional ¥9.2 trillion ($93
billion) to then on imported fossil fuels since the Fukushima accident.
Climate change effects
Carbon dioxide intensity from Japan's electricity industry climbed
again in FY2012, reaching levels 39% greater than when the country's
nuclear reactors were operating normally, and taking the sector far
beyond climate targets. About 100 million tonnes per year more CO2 is
being emitted than when the reactors were operating, adding 8% to the
country’s emissions. Up to March 2011 the CO2 intensity of
Japan’s power generation was 350 g/kWh. Over the next year, with
progressive reactor shut-downs, it rose to 487 g/kWh in FY 2012. Among
Japan's climate change goals was for the electricity sector to reduce
carbon intensity by 20% from 1990 levels, to 334 g/kWh CO2 on average over the five years from 2008 to 2012.
Reactor development 1970 on
In the 1970s a prototype Advanced Thermal Reactor (ATR) was built at
Fugen. This had heavy water moderator and light water cooling in
pressure tubes and was designed for both uranium and plutonium fuel, but
paticularly to demonstrate the use of plutonium. The 148 MWe unit,
started up in 1978, was the first thermal reactor in the world to use a
full mixed-oxide (MOX) core. It was operated by JNC until finally shut
down in March 2003. Construction of a 600 MWe demonstration ATR was
planned at Ohma, but in 1995 the decision was made not to proceed.
Since 1970, 30 BWRs (including four ABWRs) and 24 PWRs have been
brought into operation. All the PWRs, comprising 2-, 3-, and 4-loop
versions (600 to 1200 MWe classes) have been constructed by Mitsubishi.
ABWR
The first ABWRs (of 1315 MWe) were Tokyo Electric Power Co's
(Tepco's) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units 6 & 7 which started up in 1996-97
and are now in commercial operation. These were built by a consortium
of General Electric (USA), Toshiba and Hitachi. Four further ABWRs –
Hamaoka 5, Shika 2, Shimane 3 and Ohma 1 – are in operation or under
construction, and eight of the planned reactors in Japan are ABWR. These
have modular construction. Hitachi-GE talks of its 1500 MWe class
"global unified ABWR", and is developing a high-performance 1800 MWe
class ABWR. Hitachi was also developing 600, 900 and 1700 MWe versions
of the ABWR
APWR
The 1500 MWe class APWR design
is a scale-up of the four-loop PWR and has been developed by four
utilities with Mitsubishi and (earlier) Westinghouse. The APWR is in the
process of being licensed in Japan with a view to the first 1538 MWe
units being constructed at Tsuruga (units 3 & 4). Approval by Fukui
prefecture was given in March 2004. It is simpler than present PWRs,
combines active and passive cooling systems to greater effect, and has
over 55 gigawatt days per tonne (GWd/t) burn-up. Design work continues
and will be the basis for the next generation of Japanese PWRs. The
APWR+ is 1750 MWe and has full-core MOX capability.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is now marketing its 1700 MWe APWR
in the USA and Europe, and lodged an application for US design
certification in January 2008. The US-APWR has been selected by TXU (now
Luminant) for Comanche Peak, Texas, and by Dominion for its North Anna
plant. (MHI also participated in developing the Westinghouse AP1000
reactor, but now that Westinghouse has been sold to Toshiba, MHI will
develop PWR technology independently.)
Next-generation LWR
In mid-2005 the Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division of the Agency
for Natural Resources and Energy instigated a 2-year feasibility study
on development of next-generation LWRs. The new designs, based on ABWR
and APWR, are to lead to a 20% reduction in construction and generation
costs and a 20% reduction in spent fuel quantity, with improved safety
and 3-year construction and longer life. They will have at least 5%
enriched fuel and a design life of 80 years with 24-month operating
cycle, and be deployed from about 2020. In 2008 the Nuclear Power
Engineering Center was established within the Institute of Applied
Energy to pursue this goal, involving METI, FEPC and manufacturers. The
project is expected to cost JPY 60 billion over eight years, to develop
one BWR and one PWR design, each of 1700-1800 MWe. The government, with
companies including Toshiba and Hitachi-GE, will share the cost of
these. The PWR is to have thermal efficiency of 40%. Basic designs are
to be finished by 2015, with significant deployment internationally by
2030.
Power reactors operational in Japan
Reactor |
Type |
Net capacity |
Utility |
Commercial Operation |
Fukushima I-5 |
BWR
|
760 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
April 1978
|
Fukushima I-6 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
October 1979
|
Fukushima II-1 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
April 1982
|
Fukushima II-2 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
February 1984
|
Fukushima II-3 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
June 1985
|
Fukushima II-4 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
August 1987
|
Genkai 1 |
PWR
|
529 MWe
|
Kyushu
|
October 1975
|
Genkai 2 |
PWR
|
529 MWe
|
Kyushu
|
March 1981
|
Genkai 3 |
PWR
|
1127 MWe
|
Kyushu
|
March 1994
|
Genkai 4 |
PWR
|
1127 MWe
|
Kyushu
|
July 1997
|
Hamaoka 3 |
BWR
|
1056 MWe
|
Chubu
|
August 1987
|
Hamaoka 4 |
BWR
|
1092 MWe
|
Chubu
|
September 1993
|
Hamaoka 5 |
ABWR
|
1325 MWe
|
Chubu
|
January 2005
|
Higashidori 1 Tohoku |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
Tohoku
|
December 2005
|
Ikata 1 |
PWR
|
538 MWe
|
Shikoku
|
September 1977
|
Ikata 2 |
PWR
|
538 MWe
|
Shikoku
|
March 1982
|
Ikata 3 |
PWR
|
846 MWe
|
Shikoku
|
December 1994
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 1 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
September 1985
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 2 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
September 1990
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 3 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
August 1993
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 4 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
August 1994
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 5 |
BWR
|
1067 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
April 1990
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 |
ABWR
|
1315 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
November 1996
|
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 7 |
ABWR
|
1315 MWe
|
TEPCO
|
July 1997
|
Mihama 1 |
PWR
|
320 MWe
|
Kansai
|
November 1970
|
Mihama 2 |
PWR
|
470 MWe
|
Kansai
|
July 1972
|
Mihama 3 |
PWR
|
780 MWe
|
Kansai
|
December 1976
|
Ohi 1 |
PWR
|
1120 MWe
|
Kansai
|
March 1979
|
Ohi 2 |
PWR
|
1120 MWe
|
Kansai
|
December 1979
|
Ohi 3 |
PWR
|
1127 MWe
|
Kansai
|
December 1991
|
Ohi 4 |
PWR
|
1127 MWe
|
Kansai
|
February 1993
|
Onagawa 1 |
BWR
|
498 MWe
|
Tohoku
|
June 1984
|
Onagawa 2 |
BWR
|
796 MWe
|
Tohoku
|
July 1995
|
Onagawa 3 |
BWR
|
796 MWe
|
Tohoku
|
January 2002
|
Sendai 1 |
PWR
|
846 MWe
|
Kyushu
|
July 1984
|
Sendai 2 |
PWR
|
846 MWe
|
Kyushu
|
November 1985
|
Shika 1 |
BWR
|
505 MWe
|
Hokuriku
|
July 1993
|
Shika 2 |
BWR
|
1304 MWe
|
Hokuriku
|
March 2006
|
Shimane 1 |
BWR
|
439 MWe
|
Chugoku
|
March 1974
|
Shimane 2 |
BWR
|
791 MWe
|
Chugoku
|
February 1989
|
Takahama 1 |
PWR
|
780 MWe
|
Kansai
|
November 1974
|
Takahama 2 |
PWR
|
780 MWe
|
Kansai
|
November 1975
|
Takahama 3 |
PWR
|
830 MWe
|
Kansai
|
January 1985
|
Takahama 4 |
PWR
|
830 MWe
|
Kansai
|
June 1985
|
Tokai 2 |
BWR
|
1060 MWe
|
JAPC
|
November 1978
|
Tomari 1 |
PWR
|
550 MWe
|
Hokkaido
|
June 1989
|
Tomari 2 |
PWR
|
550 MWe
|
Hokkaido
|
April 1991
|
Tomari 3 |
PWR |
866 MWe |
Hokkaido |
December 2009 |
Tsuruga 1 |
BWR
|
341 MWe
|
JAPC
|
March 1970
|
Tsuruga 2 |
PWR
|
1110 MWe
|
JAPC
|
February 1987
|
Total: 50 reactors |
|
44,396 MWe
|
Fukushima I = Fukushima Daiichi, Fukushima II = Fukushima Daini
Japanese reactors under construction
Reactor |
Type |
Gross capacity |
Utility |
Construction start |
Operation* |
Monju** |
Prototype FNR |
280 MWe
(246 net)
|
JAEA |
|
Operated 1994-95, then May-Aug 2010 |
Shimane 3 |
ABWR
|
1373 MWe
|
Chugoku
|
December 2005, suspended 2011
|
deferred, TBD
|
Ohma 1 |
ABWR |
1383 MWe |
EPDC/ J-Power |
May 2010, suspended 3/11 to 10/12 |
TBD |
total (2 + Monju) |
|
3036 MWe
|
|
|
|
* Latest announced commercial operation. TBD = to be determined.
**
Monju operation is outlined in Fast Neutron Reactor section below. It
is listed here in line with JAIF categorisation, and is under
performance test process. IAEA PRIS database lists it as ‘long-term
shutdown’.
Japanese reactors planned and proposed
Reactor |
Type |
MWe gross (each) |
Utility |
start * construction |
start * operation |
Tsuruga 3
|
APWR
|
1538
|
JAPC
|
deferred
|
7/2017
|
Tsuruga 4
|
APWR
|
1538
|
JAPC
|
deferred
|
7/2018
|
Higashidori 1 Tepco |
ABWR
|
1385
|
Tepco
|
deferred
|
|
Kaminoseki 1 |
ABWR
|
1373
|
Chugoku
|
6/2012
(deferred 3/11)
|
TBD
|
Sendai 3 |
APWR
|
1590
|
Kyushu
|
3/2014
(deferred 4/11)
|
TBD |
Higashidori 2 Tepco |
ABWR
|
1385
|
Tepco
|
deferred
|
|
Hamaoka 6 |
ABWR |
1380 |
Chubu |
2016 or later |
TBD |
Higashidori 2 Tohoku |
ABWR
|
1385
|
Tohoku
|
2016
|
TBD
|
Kaminoseki 2 |
ABWR
|
1373
|
Chugoku
|
2018
(deferred 6/11)
|
TBD
|
Total Planned (9) |
|
12,947 MWe
|
|
|
|
Fukushima I-7 |
ABWR |
1380 |
Tepco |
4/2012 (suspended) |
|
Fukushima I-8 |
ABWR |
1380 |
Tepco |
4/2012 (suspended) |
|
Namie-odaka |
ABWR |
1385 |
Tohoku |
suspended |
|
Total proposed (3) |
|
4145 MWe |
|
|
|
Life extension
Power reactors are licensed for 40 years and then require approval
for life extension in 10-year increments. NISA granted a 10-year licence
extension for Fukushima Daiichi 1 in February 2011, after technical
review and some modifications in 2010. However, this was destroyed in
the 2011 accident.
In March 2010, local government approved life extension to 2016 for
JAPC's Tsuruga 1, which started commercial operation in March 1970. A
year earlier JAPC issued a technical evaluation of the reactor with a
plan for its ongoing maintenance. METI approved this in September 2009.
(JAPC then applied for life extension to 2016 in order to bridge the gap
until units 3 & 4 at Tsuruga come on line. Construction of the two
units was due to start later in 2010 and commissioning of the first was
due in March 2016.)
Then Kansai applied for a 10-year licence extension from November
2010 for its Mihama 1 PWR. The Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA) approved Kansai's long-term maintenance and management policy for
the unit and granted a life extension accordingly in June 2010, which
was then agreed by local government. Kansai in July 2011 applied for
life extension for Mihama 2, and NISA approved this in July 2012.
However, this is subject to approval from NISA's successor after
September.
Following the Fukushima accident, the government tightened
requirements for approving life extension beyond 40 years, which became
the default limit. It is proposed that operators can apply for a 20-year
licence extension from 40 years, as in the USA.
In March 2012 NISA and METI approved Shikoku Electric's strategy for
managing ageing and hence allows a 10-year life extension for its Ikata 2
PWR. However, it cannot be restarted until NISA approves stage 1
stress-test analysis.
Particular plants: most under construction and planned
Chugoku's Shimane 3 was to enter commercial
operation in December 2011, but this was delayed to March 2012 because
control rod drives had to be returned to the manufacturer for
modification and cleaning. The start-up date was then deferred until
evaluation of the Fukushima accident could be undertaken. It is 94%
complete and construction was suspended in March 2011. Chugoku finished
building a 15 m high sea wall in January 2012, and this will be extended
by 2013 to a total length of 1.5 km to also protect Shimane 1 & 2.
The Electric Power Development Corp, now known as J-Power, is building its Ohma
nuclear plant – 1383 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) – in
Aomori prefecture. Construction of unit 1 was due to start in August
2007 for commissioning in 2012, but was delayed by more stringent
seismic criteria, then delayed again in 2008, and commenced in September
2009. Construction was suspended for 18 months after the Fukushima
tsunami, with it 38% complete – JSW had completed manufacturing the
major components. J-Power in mid 2012 affirmed its intention to complete
and commission the unit, and announced resumption of work in October.
Apart from the Fugen experimental Advanced Thermal Reactor (ATR), this
will be the first Japanese reactor built to run solely on mixed oxide
(MOX) fuel incorporating recycled plutonium. It will be able to consume a
quarter of all domestically-produced MOX fuel and hence make a major
contribution to Japan's "pluthermal" policy of recycling plutonium
recovered from used fuel.
Tepco struggled for two years with the loss of its Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
capacity – nearly half of its nuclear total – following the mid 2007
earthquake. While the actual reactors were undamaged, some upgrading to
improve earthquake resistance and also major civil engineering works
were required before they resumed operation. Overall, the FY2007 (ending
March 2008) impact of the earthquake was estimated at JPY 603.5 billion
($5.62 billion), three quarters of that being increased fuel costs to
replace the 8000 MWe of lost capacity. The Nuclear & Industrial
Safety Agency (NISA) approved the utility's new seismic estimates in
November 2008, and conducted final safety reviews of the units as they
were upgraded and then restarted, the first in May 2009. Tepco undertook
seismic upgrades of units 1 and 5, the two oldest, restarting them in
2010.
Review of earthquake design criteria meant that construction of Tepco's Higashidori 1 & 2 and Fukushima Daiichi 7 & 8were
delayed, requiring investment in coal-fired (1.6 GWe) and gas plant
(4.5 GWe of LNG) to fill the gap. However, METI approved Tepco's Higashidori 1
in December 2010 and NISA approved it in January 2011, allowing Tepco
to begin work on the site. Work stopped after the Fukushima accident,
though JSW started manufacturing major components in 2011 after the
accident. Tepco before this had forecast its overall nuclear capacity
increasing from 24% of total in FY2007 to 27% of total in 2017, and
nuclear output increasing from 23% to 48% of total supply in the same
period. It then announced suspension of plans to build ABWR units 7
& 8 at Fukushima Daiichi. In 2012 it was reported that it could not
afford to proceed with Higashidori, and both are probably cancelled.
The three approved plants are to be allowed to complete construction,
despite the government's plans for scaling back nuclear power by 2040,
according to the trade minister in September 2012.
Tohoku's Higashidori 2 on the same site as Tepco's
is scheduled for construction start in 2016, though the company has yet
to decide whether to proceed. The site is in Higashidori-mura, on the
Pacific coast, near Mutsu on the eastern side of the Shimokita Peninsula
in Aomori Prefecture. The company is building a 2km seawall to protect
the site.
Chubu's Hamaoka 1 & 2 reactors, closed in 2001
and 2004 respectively for safety-related upgrades, remained shut down
following the mid 2007 earthquake. In December 2008 the company decided
to write them off (JPY 155 billion, $1.7 billion) and build a new one
there. Modifying the two 1970s units to current seismic standards would
cost about double the above amount and be uneconomic. The 540 and 840
MWe units (515 & 806 MWe net), which started operation in 1976 &
1978, will be replaced by a single new one, Hamaoka 6,
to start operating in 2020, though in April 2011 the company deferred
construction start until 2016. Hamaoka is the company's only nuclear
site, though it said that it recognizes that nuclear needs to be a
priority for both "stable power supply" and environment. However, the
shutdown of units 3-5 in May 2011 by government edict for modification
has set back plans.
Japan Atomic Power Co first submitted plans for its Tsuruga units 3 & 4
to NISA in 2004, and after considerable delay due to siting problems,
they were approved by the Fukui prefecture. JAPC then submitted a
revised construction application based on new geological data to NISA in
October 2009. The approval process, including safety checks by METI,
was expected to take two years, but the process then passed to the new
NRA. In December 2012 the NRA said that a fault zone directly beneath
the existing Tsuruga unit 2 reactor (operating since 1987) was likely to
be seismically active, and in May 2013 it endorsed an expert report
saying that the reactor poses a risk in the event of a major earthquake.
This is likely to have implications for the planned units and also unit
1. JAPC would need to spend JPY 140 billion ($1.75 billion) on civil
engineering for site preparation, including land reclamation and a
breakwater before construction start for units 3 & 4. Construction –
estimated at JPY 770 billion (US$ 7.4 billion) – was due to start in
March 2012 with commercial operation in 2017-18. This would be the first
Mitsubishi APWR plant, with each unit 1538 MWe. JAPC planned to
continue operating Tsuruga 1 beyond its scheduled shutdown date of 2010
and obtained an extension of the licence to 2016, due to the delay with
the new units. Some of the power will be supplied to Chubu.
Kyushu Electric Power Co. filed a draft environmental statement ith METI in October 2009 for its Sendai
3 plant, also an APWR, but 1590 MWe. The Ministry of Environment told
METI that the project was "absolutely essential, not just for ensuring
energy security and a stable supply of electricity... but also to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions." Local government has given approval. In 2010
METI began the process of designating it a key power source development
project. Subject to METI and NISA approval, Kyushu expects to start
construction in March 2014, for commercial operation in December 2019.
Chugoku Electric Power Co plans to build two Kaminoseki
ABWR nuclear power units on Nagashima Island on the Seto Inland Sea
coast in Kaminoseki Town, Yamaguchi Prefecture. Some site works
commenced but then halted after the Fukushima accident - 40% of the site
is to be reclaimed land. The small island community of Iwaishima a few
kilometres away has long opposed the plant. In October 2012 Chugoku
confirmed its intention to proceed.
Tohoku Electric Power Co planned to build the Namie-Odaka
BWR nuclear power plant from 2017 at Namie town in Minami Souma city in
the Fukushima prefecture on the east coast, but indefinitely deferred
this project early in 2013.
Further proposed plants
In September 2010 Tepco, Japan's biggest utility, said it planned to
invest JPY 2.5 trillion ($30.5 billion) on low-carbon projects
domestically by 2020 to generate more than half of its power free of
carbon. Most of this capacity will be nuclear. Two ABWR plants for Tepco
are listed as planned, and two as proposed.
Early in 2011 Chubu Electric Co announced that it intended to build a
new 3000-4000 MWe nuclear plant by 2030, with site and type to be
decided. Beyond the planned Hamoka 6 ABWR, this is listed as 3 x 1350
units proposed in WNA table.
Heavy manufacturing
The main company producing the heavy forgings required for nuclear
power plants spent JPY 40 billion ($330 million) from 2007 to increase
capacity in advance of orders expected from both China and the USA.
Japan Steel Works (JSW) has production and research bases in Hiroshima,
Yokohama and Muroran. The Muroran centre, in Hokkaido, hosts the heavy
steel works and research laboratory relevant to power generation.
Muroran manufactures reactor pressure vessels, steam generator
components, generator & turbine rotor shafts, clad steel plates and
turbine casings for nuclear power plants. JSW has been manufacturing
forgings for nuclear plant components to US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission standards since 1974, and around 130 JSW reactor pressure
vessels are used around the world – more than one third of the total.
See also WNA paper on Heavy manufacturing of power plants.
Fast Neutron Reactors
The Joyo experimental fast breeder reactor (FBR has
been operating successfully since it reached first criticality in 1977,
and has accumulated a lot of technical data. It is 140 MWt, and has been
shut down sine 2007 due to damage to some core components.
The 280 MWe Monju prototype FBR reactor started up
in April 1994 and was connected to the grid in August 1995, but a sodium
leakage in its secondary heat transfer system during performance tests
in December 1995 meant that it was shut down after only 205 days actual
operation, until May 2010.* It then operated for 45 days but late in
August 2010 it shut down again, due to refuelling equipment falling into
the reactor vessel. This was retrieved in June 2011 and replaced with a
new one, allowing potential restart in 2012. It produced 246 MWe (net)
when it was fully operating. Its oversight passed to JNC (now JAEA), and
the Minister for Science & Technology has been eager to see it
restarted. JAEA also undertakes FBR and related R&D at Oarai in
Ibaraki prefecture, near Tokai-mura.
In mid 2012 the Education, Science & Technology Ministry, MEXT,
outlined to the AEC some options for the future of Monju, for which it
is responsible through JAEA. If Japan opts for direct underground
disposal of used fuel, Monju will be terminated. If the closed fuel
cycle with reprocessing is continued, Monju will continue with its
original mission to prepare for commercial use of FBRs from 2050, with
demonstration unit to operate from 2025. Monju is reported to have cost
JPY 1 trillion ($12.5 billion) to build and operate, and its budget for
2012 was JPY 17.5 billion.
Originally in 1960s the concept was to use fast breeder reactors
(FBR) burning MOX fuel, making Japan virtually independent regarding
nuclear fuel. But FBRs proved uneconomic in an era of abundant low-cost
uranium, so development slowed and the MOX program shifted to thermal
LWR reactors.
From 1961 to 1994 there was a strong commitment to FBRs, with PNC as
the main agency. In 1967 FBR development was put forward as the main
goal of the Japanese nuclear program, along with the ATR. In 1994 the
FBR commercial timeline was pushed out to 2030, and in 2005 commercial
FBRs were envisaged by 2050. This remains the plan: a demonstration
breeder reactor of 500-750 MWe by 2025, and commercial 1500 MWe units by
2050.
In 1999 JNC initiated a program to review promising concepts, define a
development plan by 2005 and establish a system of FBR technology by
2015. The parameters are: passive safety, economic competitiveness with
LWR, efficient utilisation of resources (burning transuranics and
depleted U), reduced wastes, proliferation resistance and versatility
(include hydrogen production). Utilities are also involved, with CREIPI
and JAEA.
Phase 2 of the JNC study focused on four basic reactor designs:
sodium-cooled with MOX and metal fuels, helium-cooled with nitride and
MOX fuels, lead-bismuth eutectic-cooled with nitride and metal fuels,
and supercritical water-cooled with MOX fuel. All involve closed fuel
cycle, and three reprocessing routes were considered: advanced aqueous,
oxide electrowinning and metal pyroprocessing (electrometallurgical
refining). This work is linked with the Generation IV initiative, where
Japan has been playing a leading role with sodium-cooled FBRs. The JAEA
2006 budget gave a significant boost to R&D on the fast breeder fuel
cycle with an increase to JPY 34.6 billion.
In September 2006 FEPC put forward a compact sodium-cooled FBR design
of 1500 MWe using MOX fuel which it expected to be competitive with
advanced LWR designs. Mitsubishi is working on commercialisong this. A
smaller demonstration unit was envisaged for 2025.
Some work has been done by JAEA on reprocessing of used fuel from
fast reactors, with higher plutonium levels. FEPC envisages aqueous
reprocessing which recovers uranium, plutonium and neptunium together,
and minor actinides being added to the MOX pellets for burning.
JAEA is part of a project under the Generation IV International Forum
investigating the use of actinide-laden fuel assemblies in fast
reactors – The Global Actinide Cycle International Demonstration
(GACID). See Generation IV paper .
In April 2007 the government selected Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(MHI) as the core company to develop a new generation of FBRs, notably
the Japan Standard Fast Reactor (JSFR) concept, though
with breeding ratio less than 1:1. This is a large unit which will burn
actinides with uranium and plutonium in oxide fuel. It could be of any
size from 500 to 1500 MWe. The demonstration FR model was due to be
committed in 2015 and on line in 2025, and a 1500 MWe commercial FR was
proposed by MHI for 2050. From July 2007 Mitsubishi FBR Systems (MFBR)
has operated as a specialist company. It was responsible for a joint bid
with Areva for work on the US Advanced Recycling Reactor project – part
of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership based in USA.
Public Opinion
A number of public opinion polls were taken in April and May 2011
following the Fukushima accident. Those in April showed around 50%
supported the use of nuclear power at present or increased levels, but
as the crisis dragged on the May polls showed a reduction in support to
around 40% and a growth in opinion to over 40% of those wanting to
decrease it. A steady 15% or so through May- June 2011 wanted it
abolished. In March 2013, the proportion opting for increase or status
quo had dropped to 22%, while 53% wanted to decrease it and 20% wanted
to abolish it.
Uranium supply
Japan has no indigenous uranium. Its 2011 requirements of 8195 tU
will be met from Australia (about one third), Canada, Kazakhstan and
elsewhere.
Increasingly, Japanese companies are taking equity in overseas uranium projects.
In Kazakhstan, Itochu agreed to purchase 3000 tU from Kazatomprom
over ten years in 2006, and in connection with this Japanese finance
contributed to developing the West Mynkuduk deposit in Kazakhstan
(giving Sumitomo 25%, Kansai 10%). In 2007 Japanese interests led by
Marubeni and Tepco bought 40% of the Kharasan mine project in Kazakhstan
and will take 2000 tU/yr of its production. A further agreement on
uranium supply and Japanese help in upgrading the Ulba fuel fabrication
plant was signed in May 2008. In March 2009 three Japanese companies -
Kansai, Sumitomo and Nuclear Fuel Industries - signed an agreement with
Kazatomprom on uranium processing for Kansai plants.
In Uzbekistan, a Japan-Uzbek intergovernmental agreement in September
2006 was aimed at financing Uzbek uranium development and in October
2007 Itochu Corporation agreed with Navoi Mining & Metallurgy
Combinat (NMMC) to develop technology to mine and mill the black shales,
particularly the Rudnoye deposit, and to take about 300 tU/yr from
2007. Then in February 2011 Itochu signed a 10-year "large-scale"
uranium purchase agreement with NMMC.
In Australia, Mitsui joined Uranium One's Honeymoon mine project in
2008 as a 49% joint venture partner. Then early in 2009, a 20% share in
Uranium One Inc was taken by three Japanese companies, giving overall
59% Japanese equity in Honeymoon. In July 2008 Mitsubishi agreed to buy
30% of West Australia's Kintyre project for US$ 495 million, with Cameco
(70%). In February 2009 Mega Uranium sold 35% of the Lake Maitland
project to the Itochu Corporation (10% of Japanese share) and Japan
Australia Uranium Resources Development Co. Ltd. (JAURD), acting on
behalf of Kansai Electric Power Company (50%), Kyushu Electric Power
Company (25%) and Shikoku Electric Power Company (15%) for US$ 49
million.
In Namibia, Itochu Corporatioon bought a 15% stake in Kalahari
Minerals, in March 2010, for US$ 92 million. Kalahari owns 41% of
Extract Resources, which is developing the Husab project. Then in July
2010 Itochu bought a 10.3% direct stake in Extract for US$ 153 million,
mostly from Polo Resources, giving it 16.43% overall in the project.
Fuel cycle – front end
Japan has been progressively developing a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle industry, based on imported uranium.
JAEA operates a small uranium refining and conversion plant, as well
as a small centrifuge enrichment demonstration plant, at Ningyo Toge,
Okayama prefecture.
While most enrichment services are still imported, Japan Nuclear Fuel
Ltd (JNFL) operates a commercial enrichment plant at Rokkasho – RE2A.
This began operation in 1992 using indigenous technology and had seven
cascades each of 150,000 SWU/yr, though only one has been operating. It
has been testing a lead cascade of its new Shingata design, and is
re-equiping the plant with this, and 37,500 SWU/yr came fully on line in
March 2012 after a 15-month break in operations. A further 37,500/yr
SWU is due on line at the end of 2012, and its design capacity of 1.5
million SWU/yr is expected to be reached about 2022. JNFL's shareholders
are the power utilities.
A new enrichment plant in Japan using Russian centrifuge technology is planned under an agreement between Rosatom and Toshiba.
Japan has 6400 tonnes of uranium recovered from reprocessing and
stored in France and the UK, where the reprocessing was carried out. In
2007 it was agreed that Russia's Atomenergoprom would enrich this for
the Japanse utilities who own it.
At Tokai-mura, in Ibaraki prefecture north of Tokyo, Mitsubishi
Nuclear Fuel Co Ltd operates a 440 tU/yr fuel fabrication facility,
which started up in 1972 and has had majority shareholding by Mitsubishi
Materials Corporation (MMC). In April 2009 this was restructured as a
comprehensive nuclear fuel fabrication company to supply Japanese
customers with uranium fuel assemblies for pressurized water reactors
(PWR), boiling water reactors (BWR) and high-temperature gas-cooled
reactors (HTR), as well as MOX fuel assemblies. It will also provide
related services, including uranium reconversion from 2014. The new
shareholdings are MHI 35%, MMC 30%, Areva 30% and Mitsubishi Corporation
5%, with capital of JPY 11.4 billion. In October it was announced that a
new 600 t/yr plant using Areva's dry process technology would be built
by the company. As part of the new partnership with Areva, MHI and Areva
are preparing to build a dedicated nuclear fuel fabrication facility in
the USA, with each having 50% equity.
At Kumatori and Tokai, Nuclear Fuel Industries (NFI) operates two
fuel fabrication plants which have operated from 1976 and 1980
respectively. Kumatori (284 tU/yr) produces PWR and BWR fuel, Tokai (200
tU/yr capacity) is also set up to produce HTR and FNR fuel. NFI is also
involved in a project to design MOX fuel for Areva to manufacture for
Japanese power plants. In 2009 Westinghouse bought the 52% share of NFI
owned by Furukawa and Sumitomo for $100 million.
JAEA has some experimental mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication
facilities at Tokai for both the Fugen ATR and the FBR program, with
capacity about 10 t/yr for each. See also MOX section below.
Fuel Cycle – back end
For energy security reasons, and notwithstanding the low price of
uranium for many years, Japanese policy since 1956 has been to maximise
the utilisation of imported uranium, extracting an extra 25-30% of
energy from nuclear fuel by recycling the unburned uranium and plutonium
as mixed-oxide fuel (MOX). The AEC reaffirmed this in 2005.
At Tokai, JNC (now JAEA) has operated a 90 t/yr pilot reprocessing
plant using Purex technology which has treated 1140 tonnes of used fuel
between 1977 and its final batch early in 2006. It processed 5401 used
fuel assemblies, with a Pu-U mixed product. The plant now focuses on
R&D, including reprocessing of MOX fuel. JAEA operates spent fuel
storage facilities there and is proposing a further one. It has also
operated a pilot high-level waste (HLW) vitrification plant at Tokai
since 1995. Tokai is the main site of JAEA's R&D on HLW treatment
and disposal.
Until a full-scale plant was ready in Japan, the reprocessing of used
fuel has been largely undertaken in Europe by BNFL and AREVA (4200t and
2900t respectively), with vitrified high-level wastes being returned to
Japan for disposal. Areva's reprocessing finished in 2005, and
commercial operation of JNFL's reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura was
scheduled to start in 2008 (now 2013). Used fuel has been accumulating
there since 1999 in anticipation of its full-scale operation (shipments
to Europe finished in 1998).
Reprocessing involves the conventional Purex process, but Toshiba is
developing a hybrid technology using this as stage 1 to separate most
uranium, followed by an electrometallurgical process to give two
streams: actinides (plutonium and minor actinides) as fast reactor fuel,
and fission products for disposal.
In April 2012 the government announced a full review of nuclear fuel
cycle options, considering both economic and other criteria. The review
committee started by considering technical options: one scenario
involved direct disposal of used reactor fuel, two scenarios involved
this being reprocessed and with fuel materials recycled as mixed-oxide
fuel. Two more scenarios looked at the use of fast reactors and fast
breeder reactors. A review of policy options baed on these then
followed. Finally, these were combined with the addition of a time axis
with mid-to-long term scenarios. This review quantifies the amount of
plutonium and used fuel generated by each option as well as looking at
broader impacts such as energy security, the international perspective,
and the impacts of the changes resulting from each of the potential
policies.
Meanwhile the AEC fuel cycle subcommittee has updated cost estimates
for different used fuel options considering both 20% and 35% nuclear
contributions to electricity in 2030. In each case reprocessing and
recycle of used fuel is economically much better – by about 20% – than
direct disposal.
In June 2012 the AEC brought all this together focused on three
options to 2030, and sent them to the Energy & Environment Council
(Enecan) along with a recommendation that any R&D on fast reactors
should continue with international cooperation and as a means of waste
treatment.
- Option 1: if there is no new nuclear plant construction and nuclear
share declines to zero by 2030, direct underground disposal of all used
fuel is appropriate. Monju should be decommissioned.
- Option 2: if
reliance on nuclear power is reduced to 15% in 2030, both reprocessing
and direct disposal are appropriate. Monju should be run for five years,
but plans for a demonstration commercial FBR cancelled.
- Option 3:
if nuclear power retains a 20-25% share in 2030, Rokkasho plant should
operate fully (and maybe be replicated) and there could be some direct
disposal, while Monju runs for 5 or 10 years and paves the way for a
successor.
Enecan in mid-September 2012 confirmed that reprocessing would
continue. It was abolished later in the year, and METI’s Advisory
Committee for National Resources and Energy became responsible for such
energy plans.
Rokkasho complex – reprocessing and wastes
In 1984, the Federation of Electric Power Companies
(FEPC) applied to the Rokkasho-mura village and Aomori prefecture for
permission to construct a major complex including uranium enrichment
plant, low-level waste (LLW) storage centre, HLW (used fuel) storage
centre, and a reprocessing plant. Currently JNFL operates both LLW and
HLW storage facilities there, while its 800 t/yr reprocessing plant is
under construction and is being commissioned. The used fuel storage
capacity is 20,400 tonnes.
In October 2004 the Atomic Energy Commission advisory group decided
by a large majority (30 to 2) to proceed with the final commissioning
and commercial operation of JNFL's 800 t/yr Rokkasho-mura reprocessing
plant, costing some JPY 2.4 trillion (US$ 20 billion). The Commission
rejected the alternative of moving to direct disposal of spent fuel, as
in the USA. This was seen as a major confirmation of the joint
industry-government formulation of nuclear policy for the next several
decades.*
In November 2011 the AEC released results of a further study on the
same matter. At the reference 3% discount rate, direct disposal after
interim storage would cost about JPY 1 per kWh, while immediate
reprocessing of all Japanese spent fuel would cost JPY 1.98 per kWh.
Storage for 20 years followed by reprocessing would cost JPY 1.39 per
kWh.
The Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant was due to start commercial
operation in November 2008, following a 28 month test phase plus some
delay at the end of 13 years construction. The test phase treated 197 t
in PWR fuel and 134 t in BWR fuel in four cycles to January 2008. Based
on previous figures, this would have yielded about 1.8 tonnes of fissile
plutonium (in reactor-grade material). The intended start date is now
October 2013, the five-year delay being due to problems in the
locally-designed vitrification plant for HLW at the end of the line (see
below). The main plant is based on Areva's La Hague technology, and in
late 2007 the twenty-year cooperation agreement with Areva was extended
and related specifically to Global Nuclear Energy partnership (GNEP)
goals. The modified PUREX process now employed leaves some uranium with
the plutonium product – it is a 50:50 mix, so there is no separated
plutonium at any time, alleviating concerns about potential misuse.
Active testing at the new vitrification plant attached to the
Rokkasho reprocessing plant commenced in November 2007, with separated
high-level wastes being combined with borosilicate glass. The plant
takes wastes after uranium and plutonium are recovered from used fuel
for recycle, leaving 3% of the used fuel as high-level radioactive
waste. However, the furnaces (developed at Tokai, rather than being part
of the French technology) have proved unable to cope with impurities in
the wastes, and commissioning was repeatedly delayed. Finally in 2010
JNFL decided to redesign the unit to better control temperature of the
molten glass, resulting in a delay for commissioning. One of the two
rebuilt furnaces was tested successfully in July 2012, producing ten
batches of vitrified HLW, and a second test run successfully produced 33
canisters by mid January 2013, confirming its 70 litres/hour HLW rate.
The other system was tested similarly by May 2013, producing 25 logs of
vitrified HLW, each from 70 litres of liquid HLW. JNFL will be ready to
commission the plant in October 2013, but must await NRA inspections
which will not take place until December, after new fuel cycle
regulations are published.
The new Rokkasho plant will treat 14,000 tonnes of used fuel
stockpiled there to end of 2005 plus 18,000 tonnes of used fuel arising
from 2006, over some 40 years. It will produce about 4 tonnes of fissile
plutonium per year, enough for about 80 tonnes of MOX fuel.
The Rokkasho facility has storage capacity for 2880 canisters of
vitrified HLW. At the end of 2012 it had 1414 canisters, 1310 of these
from La Hague.
Mutsu storage
In 2010 Recyclable-Fuel Storage Co (Tepco 80%, Japco 20%) obtained
approval to construct a facility at Mutsu in Aomori prefecture to store
used fuel from Tepco and Japco nuclear plants for some 50 years before
reprocessing at the Japan Nuclear Fuel plant. Initial capacity will be
3000 tonnes, in dry casks, and a further stage after 10-15 years will
add 2000 t capacity. NISA approved this in August 2010. Construction
started but was suspended for a year in March 2011, then resumed in
March 2012. The new target completion is August 2013 with a view to
receiving casks in October. It was half complete in April 2012. About
70% of the JPY 100 billion cost is reported to be the casks.
Mixed-oxide fuel (MOX)
The Federation of Electric Power Companies has said that nine member
companies will use plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in 16-18 reactors
from 2015 under the "pluthermal" program. About 6 tonnes of fissile
plutonium per year (in about 9 tonnes of reactor-grade Pu) is expected
to be loaded into power reactors. Meanwhile MOX fuel fabricated in
Europe from some 40 tonnes of separated reactor-grade plutonium (25.6t
Puf) from Japanese used fuel can be used. However, local concerns about
MOX fuel use has slowed implementation of the 1994 "pluthermal" program,
and not until late 2009 was there a commercial Japanese reactor running
with MOX.
By end of January 2010 the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA) on behalf of the Ministry (METI) had approved the use of MOX fuel
in ten reactors, including: Takahama 3 & 4, Fukishima I-3,
Kashiwazaki Kariwa 3, Genkai 3, Hamaoka 4, Onagawa 3 and Shimane-2. This
is expected to occur progressively to 2012, after modifications to the
reactors to take a one quarter or one third core of MOX. NISA permission
for MOX use in Tomari 3 is pending.
Two prefectural governments – Fukushima and Niigata – moved to defer
the use of MOX fuel at reactors within those prefectures, forcing TEPCO
and Kansai to suspend or reschedule their planned use there. In 2008 the
Shizuoka prefecture accepted Chubu's plans to use MOX in its Hamaoka-4
plant. Fukui prefecture accepted Kansai's planned use of MOX at
Takahama-3 and 4 from 2010, and Hokkaido accepted Hokkaido Electric
Power's use of MOX at Tomari-3, making a total of 11 reactors allowed to
use it. Early in 2010 Fukushima prefecture agreed to MOX use in TEPCO's
Fukushima I-3 reactor, and in July NISA confirmed this approval.
So far, Japan has received five shipments containing over two tonnes
of its (reactor-grade) plutonium from Europe. The first shipment, in
1992, was simply plutonium oxide and earmarked for use in the Monju
prototype FBR.
Subsequent shipments have been in the form of MOX fuel for light
water reactors. The first MOX shipment was in 1999. Part of this
shipment from BNFL and intended for use in Kansai Electric Power Co's
Takahama plant was found to contain falsified quality control data, so
that material was returned to the UK in 2002. The balance was for
Tepco's Fukishima I-3. The second MOX shipment in 2001 consisted of fuel
from BNFL for use in TEPCO's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa-3 reactor. The third
MOX shipment was fuel for Chubu's Hamaoka BWR, Shikoku's Ikata PWR and
Kyushu's Genkai PWR, and arrived from France in May 2009. The fourth MOX
shipment in 2010 from France contained 12 assemblies for Kansai's
Takahama 4 and 20 for the second load at Genkai 3. The shipment which
arrived in June 2013 was for Kansai’s Takahama 3 plant.
In November 2009 Kyushu Electric Power started using MOX in its
Genkai-3 reactor. During a scheduled refuelling outage the company
replaced about one-third of the 193 PWR fuel assemblies, 16 of them
comprising MOX fuel. Shikoku Electric Power Co started Ikata-3 with some
MOX fuel in March 2010, and Tepco started up Fukishima-Daiichi 3 BWR
with MOX fuel in September 2010. Kansai started using MOX in its
Takahama-3 PWR in January 2011, but in mid 2011 deferred its use in unit
4.
For its new Ohma ABWR plant, designed to run on a full MOX core,
J-Power has signed a contract with Areva to supply the first three
years' fuel, fabricated from Japanese plutonium separated in France.
Areva also has MOX fabrication contracts with Chubu, Kyushu, Shikoku and
Kansai.
Meanwhile, Japan's plutonium stocks increase, with
separated reactor-grade plutonium (about 65% fissile) stored and
awaiting use in MOX fuel. At the end of 2011 there was 9.925 tonnes of
plutonium stored domestically, including over 3 t at JNFL's reprocessing
plant, plus 35 t overseas - 17.93 t in France and 17.03 t in the UK.
During 2009 1.345 t Pu was loaded into Japanese reactors in MOX fuel and
1.72 t was added to storage. It was estimated that 5.5 to 6.5 tonnes of
Puf would be used each year from about 2012, though in 2011 only 640 kg
was loaded.
J-MOX plant
In April 2005 the Aomori prefecture approved construction of the
JNFL's J-MOX plant at Rokkasho, adjacent to the reprocessing plant. The
Governor urged the Federation of Electric Power Companies "to step up
their efforts towards realisation of the MOX-use program." The approval
was seen as a significant step forward in closing the fuel cycle in
Japan, and was strongly supported by the federal government, Atomic
Energy Commission and utilities. JNFL has applied for two of the four
licences needed to build and operate the 130 t/yr plant. Construction of
the plant started in October 2010 after a three-year delay due to
revision of seismic criteria. Operation of J-MOX is now expected about
March 2016, and the cost has escalated to JPY 190 billion (US$ 2.4
billion). It will produce MOX with 4 to 9% plutonium.
In November 2006 Shikoku Electric Power contracted with Mitsubishi to
manufacture 21 MOX fuel assemblies for its Ikata nuclear plant using
600 kg of reactor-grade plutonium. The plutonium had been recovered by
Areva at La Hague from Shikoku's used fuel and the MOX was fabricated at
Areva's Melox plant in France and shipped to Japan in March 2009.
With the delay in construction of the J-MOX plant, several other utilities have sought MOX fuel supplies from Areva in France.
Once MOX fuel is fully in routine use in Japan, it is expected that
the Japanese stockpile of separated plutonium in Europe will be used up
in about 15 years, with demand being about 6 tonnes per year of fissile
plutonium and output from Rokkasho only 4 tonnes Puf.
METI approved construction a used fuel storage facility for Tepco and
Japco in Mutsu, at the same time as approving J-MOX. Government
approval for both followed in May
High-Level Wastes
In 1995, Japan's first high-level waste (HLW) interim storage
facility opened in Rokkasho-mura – the Vitrified Waste Storage Centre.
The first shipment of vitrified HLW
from Europe (from the reprocessing of Japanese fuel) also arrived in
that year. The last of twelve shipments from France was in 2007, making a
total of 1310 canisters. Shipments from UK started in 2010, with 1850
canisters to go in about 11 shipments. These include an equivalent
amount of HLW to avoid the need to transport greater amounts of
low-level wastes (LLW). The first shipment arrived in March 2010.
In 2005 Tepco and JAPC announced that a Recyclable Fuel Storage
Centre would be established in Mutsu, with 5000 t capacity, to provide
interim storage for up to 50 years before used fuel is reprocessed. See
fuller description above.
In May 2000, the Japanese parliament (the Diet) passed the Law on
Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive Waste (the "Final Disposal Law")
which mandates deep geological disposal of high-level waste (defined as
only vitrified waste from reprocessing spent reactor fuel). In line
with this, the Nuclear Waste Management Organisation (NUMO) was set up
in October 2000 by the private sector to progress plans for disposal,
including site selection, demonstration of technology there, licensing,
construction, operation, monitored retrievable storage for 50 years and
closure of the repository. Some 40,000 canisters of vitrified HLW are
envisaged by 2020, needing disposal – all the arisings from the Japanese
nuclear plants until then.
NUMO has begun an open solicitation process to find a site, and will
shortlist those that are proffered and potentially suitable. The
promising ones will be subject to detailed investigation from 2012. A
third phase to 2030 will end with site selection.
Repository operation is expected from about 2035, and the JPY 3000
billion (US$ 28 billion) cost of it will be met by funds accumulated at
0.2 yen/kWh from electricity utilities (and hence their customers) and
paid to NUMO. This sum excludes any financial compensation paid by the
government to local communities.
In mid 2007 a supplementary waste disposal bill was passed which says
that final disposal is the most important issue in steadily carrying
out nuclear policy. It calls for the government to take the initiative
in helping the public nationally to understand the matter by promoting
safety and regional development, in order to get the final disposal site
chosen with certainty and without delay. It also calls for improvement
in disposal technology in cooperation with other countries, revising the
safety regulations as necessary, and making efforts to recover public
trust by, for example, establishing a more effective inspection system
to prevent the recurrence of data falsifications and cover-ups.
The technical aspects of Japan's HLW disposal concept is based on two
decades' work under JNC (now JAEA) involving generic evaluation of
repository requirements in Japan's geology. The technical aspects of
Japan's HLW disposal concept is based on two decades' work under JNC
(now JAEA) involving generic evaluation of repository requirements in
Japan's geology. Since 2000 the Horonobe Underground Research Centre has
been under development on Hokkaido, investigating sedimentary rocks
about 500m deep, and in November 2005 construction of the underground
shafts and galleries was launched. JAEA runs the Tona Geoscience Centre
at Toki, in Gifu prefecture, and is building a similar facility, the
Mizunami Underground Research Laboratory (MIU) also in Gifu prefecture,
in igneous rock about 1000m deep. By the end of 2012 two shafts were 500
m deep and the first research and access tunnels were dug.
The basic repository concept involves sealing about 20 HLW canisters
in a massive steel cask or overpack and surrounding this by bentonite
clay. NUMO has built design options on this including those allowing
inspection and retrieval over long periods. In particular the Cavern
Retrievable (CARE) concept has emerged, involving two distinct stages:
ventilated underground caverns with the wastes in overpacks (hence
shielded) fully accessible, followed by backfilling and sealing the
caverns after 300 years or so. The initial institutional control period
allows radiological decay of the wastes so that thermal load is much
reduced by stage 2 and hence the concept allows a much higher density of
wastes than other disposal concepts.
The CARE concept can be adapted for spent fuel, the cask then being
similar to shipping casks for such except that a layer of shielding
required due to higher thermal and radiation output could be removable
before the cavern is backfilled and sealed. However, for spent fuel
retrieval would be likely rather than merely possible, since it
represents a significant potential fuel resource (via reprocessing),
whereas vitrified HLW does not. Also spent fuel would require ease of
access due to the need for safeguards inspections. Eventual backfill
could include depleted uranium if that is then considered a waste.
In 2004 METI estimated the costs of reprocessing spent fuel,
recycling its fissile material and management of all wastes over 80
years from 2005. METI's Electricity Industry Committee undertook the
study, focused on reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication including the
decommissioning of those facilities (but excluding decommissioning of
power reactors). Total costs over 80 years amount to some JPY 19
trillion, contributing almost one yen (US 0.9 cents) per kilowatt-hour
at 3% discount rate. About one third of these costs would still be
incurred in a once-through fuel cycle, along with increased high-level
waste disposal costs and increased uranium fuel supply costs. Japan's
policy however is based on energy security rather than purely economic
criteria.
Funding arrangements for HLW were changed in October 2005 under the
new Back-end Law which set up the Radioactive Waste Management Funding
and Research Centre (RWMC) as the independent funds management body. All
reserves held by utilities were to be transferred to it and companies
then refunded as required for reprocessing.
Low- and Intermediate-level wastes
JNFL operates a large LLW storage facility at Rokkasho. METI, with
JNFL and FEPC, is seeking permission from the Aomori prefecture to build
further low-level waste storage capacity there, adjacent to the
reprocessing plant. In particular this will be for LLW and what is
internationally designated as ILW returned from France from 2013. NISA
recommended approval early in 2012 to increase capacity to 2000 drums
(200-litre).
Decommissioning
The Japan Power Demonstration Reactor (JPDR) decommissioning program,
following its closure in 1976, established the necessary techniques for
the decommissioning of commercial power reactors by the Japan Atomic
Energy Research Institute (JAERI). Phase I of the program started in
1981 to develop a set of techniques and Phase II was actual dismantling
of JPDR over 1986-92.
The original Tokai-1 power station, a British Magnox reactor which
started up at the end of 1965 and closed down in March 1998, is being
decommissioned over 20 years, the first ten as "safe storage" to allow
radioactivity to decay. Phase 1 (to 2006) comprised preliminary work, in
Phase 2 (to 2011) the steam generators and turbines are being removed,
and in Phase 3 (to 2018) the reactor will be dismantled, the buildings
demolished and the site left ready for re-use. All radioactive wastes
will be classified as low-level (LLW), albeit in three categories, and
will be buried - the 1% of level I wastes 50-100 metres deep. The total
cost is expected to be JPY 93 billion - 35 billion for dismantling and
JPY 58 billion for waste treatment including the graphite moderator
(which escalates the cost significantly).
Fugen ATR (148 MWe, started up in 1978) closed in March 2003, and
JAEA plans to decommission it and demolish to clear the site by 2029, at
a total cost of about JPY 70 billion, including waste treatment and
disposal. Plans for this were approved in February 2008.
Chubu's Hamaoka 1 & 2, earlier closed for safety-related
upgrades, remained shut down following the 2007 earthquake, were written
off, and are now being decommissioned.
In March 2011 units 1-4 of the Fukushima Daiichi plant (2719 MWe net) were seriously damaged in a major accident, and are written off to be decommissioned.
Japanese reactors decommissioned
Reactor |
Type |
Net capacity MWe |
Utility |
Commercial operation |
JPDR |
BWR |
12 |
JAERI |
2/65 - 3/76 |
Tokai 1 |
Magnox |
137 |
Japco |
7/66 - 3/98 |
Fugen |
ATR |
148 |
JNC |
3/79 - 3/03 |
Hamaoka 1 |
BWR |
515 |
Chubu |
3/76 - 2/09 |
Hamaoka 2 |
BWR |
806 |
Chubu |
11/78 - 2/09 |
Fukushima I-1 |
BWR |
439 |
Tepco |
3/71 - 3/11 |
Fukushima I-2 |
BWR |
760 |
Tepco |
7/74 - 3/11 |
Fukushima I-3 |
BWR |
760 |
Tepco |
3/76 - 3/11 |
Fukushima I-4 |
BWR |
760 |
Tepco |
10/78 - 3/11 |
JAEA has been responsible for research on reactor
decommissioning. However, in August 2013 an International Research
Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) was set up in Japan by JAEA, Japanese utilities and reactor vendors, with a focus on Fukushima 1-4.
Research & Development
The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and the Atomic
Fuel Corporation were set up in 1956. The latter was renamed PNC in 1967
and reconstituted as Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) in
1998. A merger of JNC and JAERI in 2005 created the Japan Atomic Energy
Agency (JAEA) under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
& Technology (MEXT). JAEA is now a major integrated nuclear R&D
organization, with 4400 employees at ten facilities and annual budget
of JPY 161 billion (US$ 1.7 billion).
At the end of 1998 JAEA's small prototype gas cooled reactor, the 30
MWt High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR) started up at the
Oarai R&D Centre. This was Japan's first graphite-moderated and
helium-cooled reactor. It runs at 850°C and in 2004 achieved 950°C,
which will allow its application to chemical processes such as
thermochemical production of hydrogen. Its fuel is ceramic-coated
particles incorporated into hexagonal graphite prisms, giving it a high
level of inherent safety. It is designed to establish a basis for the
commercialisation of second-generation helium-cooled plants running at
high temperatures for either industrial applications or to drive direct
cycle gas turbines. By 2015 an iodine-sulfur plant producing 1000 m3/hr
of hydrogen is expected to be linked to the HTTR to confirm the
performance of an integrated production system.
JAEA's Japan Materials Testing Reactor (JMTR) at the Oarai R&D
Centre is being refurbished for 2011 resumption of operation, when it
will produce some radioisotopes, notably Mo-99, as well as enable basic
research on LWR fuel and materials, and other applications. The JMTR was
initially converted from 93% HEU fuel to 45% enriched fuel in 1991, and
then to 19.8% enriched fuel in 1994.
The Reduced-Moderation Water Reactor (RMWR) being developed in Japan
is a light water reactor, essentially as used today, with the fuel
packed in more tightly to reduce the moderating effect of the water.
Considering the BWR variant (resource-renewable BWR – RBWR), only the
fuel assemblies and control rods are different. In particular, the fuel
assemblies are much shorter, so that they can still be cooled
adequately. Ideally they are hexagonal, with Y-shaped control rods. The
reduced moderation means that more fissile plutonium is produced and the
breeding ratio is around 1 (instead of about 0.6), and much more of the
U-238 is converted to Pu-239 and then burned than in a conventional
reactor. Burn-up is about 45 GWd/t, with a long cycle. Initial seed
(all??) MOX fuel needs to have about 10% Pu. The void reactivity is
negative, as in conventional LWR. A Hitachi RBWR design based on the
ABWR-II has the central part of each fuel assembly (about 80% of it)
with MOX fuel rods and the periphery uranium oxide. In the MOX part,
minor actinides are burned as well as recycled plutonium.
The main rationale for RMWRs is extending the world's uranium
resource and providing a bridge to widespread use of fast neutron
reactors. Recycled plutonium should be used preferentially in RMWRs
rather than as MOX in conventional LWRs, and multiple recycling of
plutonium is possible. JAERI started the research on RMWRs in 1997 and
then collaborated in the conceptual design study with the Japan Atomic
Power Company (JAPCO) in 1998. Hitachi has also been closely involved.
A new reprocessing technology is part of the RMWR concept. This is
the fluoride volatility process, developed in 1980s, and is coupled with
solvent extraction for plutonium to give Hitachi's Fluorex process. In
this, 90-92% of the uranium in the used fuel is volatalised as UF6, then
purified for enrichment or storage. The residual is put through a Purex
circuit which separates fission products and minor actinides as HLW,
leaving the unseparated U-Pu mix (about 4:1) to be made into MOX fuel.
Japan's International Institute for Advanced Studies based in Kyoto
is reported to be developing thorium-fueled molten salt reactor
technology, though this is not evident from its website.
Regulation and safety
The Atomic Energy Commission is a senior policy body which was part of the Cabinet Office and has apparently now been restored there.
The former Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA) within the Ministry of Economy Trade & Industry (METI, the
successor of MITI) was responsible for nuclear power regulation,
licensing and safety. It conducted regular inspections of safety-related
aspects of all power plants.
In mid-2011, following the Fukushima accident, the government decided to establish a new and more independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)
under the Environment Ministry. This was established in September 2012
and combined the roles of NISA and NSC, and also the monitoring
functions of the Education & Science Ministry (MEXT). The four
commissioners and chairman were appointed in February 2013. It started
with a staff of 473, nearly three quarters of whom were from NISA, and a
budget of ¥50 billion/yr (about $600 million). It is modelled on the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The first task of the NRA is decide on
reactor restarts (see earlier section). In July 2013 NRA published two
sets of regulations with regard to detailed design of nuclear power
plant systems and severe accident management procedures.
Regulations relating to the fuel cycle and research reactors
including Monju are due to be published in December 2013. The new
regulations will apply to two used fuel reprocessing plants – JNFL’s
Rokkasho commercial plant and the older JAEA facility at Tokai (shut
down since 2007); seven fuel fabrication facilities, including JNFL’s
partially completed mixed-oxide fuel facility; Recyclable-Fuel Storage
Co.’s partially completed interim spent fuel storage facility at Mutsu;
four waste storage facilities; 22 research reactors; and 15 large and
196 small facilities using nuclear fuel for research.
Also coming under the remit of the Ministry of the Environment is a new 5-member Nuclear Safety Investigation Commission
(NSIC), which replaced the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) – a senior
government body set up in 1978 under the Atomic Energy Basic Law and
responsible for formulating policy, alongside the Atomic Energy
Commission. NSIC will review the effectiveness of the NRA and be
responsible for the investigation of nuclear accidents. The Environment
Ministry already handles disposal of radiation-contaminated debris
around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The lower house of
parliament (Diet) passed the enabling legislation in mid June 2012, with
the support of all three main parties, and the upper house endorsed it a
week later. The reform was implemented in September. Key issues will be
addressed toward creating a stronger and more effective safety
regulatory organization, with a plan to be issued by year end. As an
expression of its determination to strengthen nuclear safety regulation
Japan plans to receive an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service
mission later in 2012.
Following the Fukushima accident, the Energy and Environment Council Council
(Enecan or EEC) was set up by the cabinet office in mid 2011 as the
energy arm of the National Policy Unit, being chaired by that minister.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Central Environment Council
apparently came under Enecan until it was abolished by the new
government at the end of 2012.
The Science & Technology Agency was responsible for safety of
test and research reactors, nuclear fuel facilities and radioactive
waste management, as well as R&D, but its functions were taken over
by NISA in 2001.
In June 2012 parliament amended the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law to
stipulate that nuclear plant operators must prevent the release of
radioactive materials at abnormal levels following severe accidents, and
that the NRA is to formulate regulations to achieve this.
The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organisation (JNES)
was set up in 2003 to inspect nuclear installations and nuclear reactor
facilities and undertake safety analysis and evaluations of the design
of nuclear installations and nuclear reactor facilities. It has 423
staff (as of January 2013) and functions as technical support for NRA.
A new inspection system of nuclear facilities came into effect in
2009, following deliberations on the matter since November 2005. Under
the new system, the number of nuclear power plants approved for
operation over 40 years was expected to increase, starting with Tsuruga
1.
The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) has a Committee for Investigation of Nuclear Safety.
Nuclear safeguards will remain with METI after the regulatory functions are removed.
Regulatory history
Well before the Fukushima accident, public support for nuclear power
in Japan had been eroded since the 1990s due to a series of accidents
and scandals. The accidents to 2011 were the 1996 sodium leak at the
Monju FBR, a fire at the JNC waste bituminisation facility connected
with its reprocessing plant at Tokai, and the 1999 criticality accident
at a small fuel fabrication plant at Tokai. The criticality accident,
which claimed two lives, happened as a result of workers following an
unauthorised procedures manual. None of these accidents were in
mainstream civil nuclear fuel cycle facilities. However, the 1999
accident did lead to safety improvements at nuclear power plants,
notably the establishment of emergency off-site facilities (EOF) at all
of them.
Following the 1999 Tokai criticality accident, electric power
companies, along with enterprises involved with the nuclear industry
established the Nuclear Safety Network (NSnet). The network's main
activities were to enhance the safety culture of the nuclear industry,
conduct peer reviews, and disseminate information about nuclear safety.
In 2005 this was incorporated into the Japan Nuclear Technology
Institute ( JANTI), as the Safety Culture Division. Peer reviews
'tailored to the corporate structure' are implemented periodically for
members of NS net involve in the nuclear fuel cycle of Japan. JANTI's
Operating Experience Analysis Division collects and analyses operating
experience information that was previously handled by the Central
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) Nuclear
Information Center. The Safety Culture Division cooperates with US
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and WANO.
Japan's former Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) confirmed in April
2002 that using mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is safe, and that its use at up
to 18 reactors by 2010 was supported. Senior members of the government
have reaffirmed that the country's use of MOX "must happen", and that
the government will initiate educational and information programs to win
wider acceptance for it.
In 2002 a scandal erupted over the documentation of equipment
inspections at Tepco's reactors, and extended to other plants. While the
issues were not safety-related, the industry's reputation was sullied.
Inspection of the shrouds and pumps around the core is the
responsibility of the company, which in this case had contracted it out.
In May 2002 questions emerged about data falsification and the
significance of cracks in reactor shrouds (used to direct water flow in
BWRs) and whether faults were reported to senior management. By May 2003
Tepco had shut down all its 17 reactors for inspections, and by the end
of 2003 only seven had been restarted. Replacement power cost on
average over 50% more than the 5.9 yen/kWh (5.5 cents US) nuclear
generation cost. Tepco eventually had all its reactors back on line,
with the whole fiasco costing it about JPY 200 billion (US$ 1.9
billion).
In 2007 NISA ordered reactor owners to check their records for
incidents which should have been reported at the time but were not. This
revealed a brief (15 minute) criticality incident during refuelling at
Hokuriku's Shika 1 BWR in 1999. A series of deficiencies and errors
contributed to the incident, and clearly more should have been learned
from it to benefit other operators of boiling water reactors such as
Chubu and Tohoku, which have also had control rod anomalies over the
last 20 years. Tepco said that its Fukishima I-3 BWR may have
experienced criticality over seven hours during an outage in 1978, when
control rods slipped out of position. NISA ordered the Shika-1 reactor
to be shut down for detailed checks.
Seismic concerns
Because of the frequency and magnitude of earthquakes in Japan,
particular attention is paid to seismic issues in the siting, design and
construction of nuclear power plants. In May 2007 revised seismic
criteria were announced which increased the design basis criteria by a
factor of about 1.5 and required utilities to undertake some
reinforcement of older plants. See also paper on Nuclear Power Plants
& Earthquakes.
In July 2007 the Niigata Chuetsu-Oki earthquake occurred on a fault
very close to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, and the ground
acceleration exceeded the design parameters for the plant, ie it was
more severe than the plant was required to be designed for. The
operating reactors shut down safely and there was no damage to the main
parts of the plant. The government (METI) then set up a 20-member
Chuetsu Investigation and Countermeasures Committee to investigate the
specific impact of this earthquake on the power station, and in the
light of this to identify what government and utilities must address to
ensure nuclear plant safety. It acknowledged that the government was
responsible for approving construction of the first units in the 1970s
very close to what is now perceived to be a geological fault line. It
was also agreed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would
join Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission in a review of the situation.
The second IAEA team confirmed after inspecting key internal components
that there was apparently "no significant damage to the integrity of the
plant". Ground subsidence damaged much equipment around the seven
reactors, but the main part of each plant is built on bedrock, which had
entailed excavation in some places to 45 metres.
In October 2008 NISA presented to the NSC its evaluation of Tepco's
report on Kashiwazaki Kariwa, assessing it as "appropriate". It
contained the results of Tepco's inspections and assessments of
equipment, buildings and other structures at the plant following the
July 2007 earthquake. In 2009 the NSC endorsed NISA's recommendation
that units 6 & 7 be restarted.
Tsunamis are also a feature of Japan and Kuril Islands. Since 1498
there have been 16 tsunamis with maximum amplitudes above 10 metres
(some much more), these having arisen from earthquakes of magnitude 7.4
to 9.0, on average one every 30 years. The accident arising from the 11
March 2011 tsunami is described in the paper on the Fukushima Accident.
International outlook
Apart from some active interest in uranium exploration and mine
investment in Australia and Canada to help secure fuel supplies, for
many years the Japanese nuclear industry was focused domestically, but
in the 1990s it started to look at export possibilities and
international collaboration.
Companies such as Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Toshiba formed important
alliances internationally or took over major foreign nuclear companies.
In heavy manufacturing, particularly of large forgings, Japan Steel
Works is generally regarded as the world leader. Other enterprises are
also active in export of major reactor components.
At the government level, there were agreements with several
governments including Kazakhstan. Then NISA set up the International
Nuclear Power Safety Working Group in 2008 to cooperate in the field of
nuclear safety with emerging countries, primarily in Asia, planning to
introduce and expand their use of nuclear power.
This led in 2009 to an industry-based group, the JAIF International
Cooperation Center (JICC), established with government backing to
support countries planning to introduce nuclear power generation, and
the International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Council, a forum for the
relevant Japanese government authorities and private institutes to
collaborate in international aid.
In October 2010 industry and government set up the International
Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co Ltd (JINED) to export nuclear
goods and services collaboratively. The new company will solicit orders
for nuclear power plants from countries such as Vietnam starting their
own nuclear power programs, and advise on project and infrastructure
development, bolstered by legislative and financing support from the
Japanese Government. A separate company will be set up to act as
engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractor. The main
company, associated with JAIF and JICC, is owned by the government
(METI, through Innovation Network Corporation), nine utilities (Chubu,
Kansai and Tepco being main shareholders), and three manufacturers
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Toshiba and Hitachi).
For Vietnam's second nuclear power plant, Japan Atomic Power Co. and
JINED have signed an agreement with Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) to
undertake the project. The government has appointed Mitsubishi to
prepare a PWR proposal and Hitachi to prepare one using BWR technology.
In June 2008 an agreement on high-temperature gas-cooled reactor
research was initialled by JAEA and the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy
Committee, focused on small cogeneration plants.
Non-proliferation
The Atomic Energy Basic law prohibits the military use of nuclear
energy and successive governments have articulated principles
reinforcing this. In 1976 Japan became a party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty with its safeguards arrangements administered
by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, and in 1999 it was one
of the first countries to ratify the Additional Protocol with IAEA,
accepting intrusive inspections.
Japan is noteworthy in being the only non-weapons state under the NPT
with major fuel cycle facilities, which are thus under full safeguards.
The Rokkasho reprocessing plant is the first such plant to be under
full IAEA safeguards (others are under Euratom safeguards). Monitoring
equipment funded by IAEA was built in to the plant, which was a novel
challenge for both IAEA and JNFL.
Japan also has bilateral safeguards arrangements with its major
nuclear supplier states and has long been a member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group which restricts export of nuclear equipment.
References: Japan
Nuclear Fuel Cycle, TEPCO, March 2002.
Nuclear Power Stations in Japan, CRIEPI, January 2000.
Paper by H Kurihara, WNA Symposium, 2002.
Masuda, S. 2003, HLW Disposal Program in Japan, KAIF/KNS Conference, Seoul.
Ichimiya, M. 2003, Design Study on Advanced Fast Reactor Cycle System in Japan, KAIF/KNS Conference.
Pickett S.E. 2002, Japan's nuclear energy policy, Energy Policy 30, 1337-55, Dec 2002.
Nuclear Engineering International, Oct 1998 & Nov 2004.
JAIF Atoms in Japan , various.
Tanaka, H 2006, Japan's nuclear power program, WNA Symposium 2006
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